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REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS:
T0WARDS A GREATER COOPERATION
Harold M. Williams and Lee B. Spencer, Jr.*
MR. MUNDHEIM: The presentations and discussions yesterday
demonstrated the multinational aspect of the securities business.
As we discovered in our discussion of the activities of banks,
businesses with multinational aspects find a number of supervisory
agencies with responsibility for or at least an interest in those
activities. That fact inevitably leads to thinking about the de-
sirability of and the obstacles to cooperation among the involved
supervisory bodies. Such cooperation is the major topic of our
discussion this morning. Lee Spencer is our keynote speaker on this
subject.
1. THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
MR. SPENCER: As this gathering attests, the idea of a world
securities market is receiving increasing prominence. Two current
developments seem to be laying the foundation for such a world market.
The first is the growing international market for primary offerings
of debt securities--the Eurobond market--which has been maturing
over the past two decades into a major, worldwide market for both
long-term and short-term capital. It is a very innovative, constant-
ly expanding market with a diverse mix of issuers, including corpora-
tions and governments.
The second development is the increasing interconnection of
the major national markets. Rapid advances in communications and
technology now make it possible to follow markets and virtually
instantaneously to transfer money and securities throughout the
world. Furthermore, the growth of multinational corporations with
a worldwide investor following has served to heighten awareness and
interest in foreign issuers.
Indeed, the emerging world market already is affecting the
way many companies raise capital. It now is not unusual for cor-
porations to make public offerings in foreign markets and to list
their securities on foreign exchanges. In 1978, for example, Sears
Roebuck made the first offering of debt securities in Japan by a
foreign, non-governmental issuer since the pre-World War II era.
Further, several privately-held natural resource companies from the
U.S. are contemplating going public--not in the U.S. as might be
expected, but in Vancouver, British Columbia, a world center for
natural resource risk capital. Moreover, during the last decade the
use of simultaneous primary offerings of securities through separate
underwriting syndicates in several countries has emerged.
*The views herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily
those of the SEC.
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Business combinations are also assuming an increasingly in-
ternational flavor--in large part due to the worldwide trend of
removing currency exchange controls. As an illustration, within the
past year, the first two registration statements relating to hostile
exchange offers by a U.S. company for a foreign company have been
filed.
In fact, even a combination of two companies from the same
country may have international implications. For example, recently
a merger of two foreign companies, which involved an issuance of
securities, was postponed in order for a registration statement to
be filed with the Commission; a substantial number of the share-
holders of the target company were U.S. citizens or residents.
It should not be suggested, however, that an established
world securities market system is yet an accomplished fact. Nor is
its development necessarily within easy reach: the experience of
the national market system in the U.S. suggests the difficulties
faced in linking markets. Add to that important differences in
language and customs and varying national disclosure, trading, and
enforcement policies and interest and one must conclude that estab-
lishing a world securities market system is a most ambitious endeavor.
It is, nonetheless, a most worthwhile effort. In a world
securities market, corporations could broaden their ownership base
and have a wider market for their securities. This market would
also assist companies to raise funds in the various currencies that
they may need for their global operations. Further, investors could
benefit by having more investment choices. They could, in effect,
select among different economies and different currencies as well as
different industries and companies. The welfare of the world as a
whole could additionally benefit. A properly functioning world se-
curities market would permit the more efficient allocation of the
increasingly scarce world resources.
Today, we will examine these market developments and highlight
some of the implications they raise on regulatory policies. The
point will be that the increasingly international character of the
securities markets and securities professionals can, if not addressed
by regulatory authorities in a thoughtful and coordinated manner,
lead to costly economic misallocations and diminished investor pro-
tections. To this end, ideas will be offered for an International
Committee of Securities Regulators to address broadly and coherently,
the regulatory issues raised by the emerging world securities market-
place.
2. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORS
A. Regulatory Disparities
At the outset, it can be noted that securities regulation is
not homogeneous throughout the world. Indeed, much of the interna-
tional capital market is completely unregulated. And, while the
domestic markets are generally regulated, the character of regulation
may vary greatly. Some countries, such as Korea, use a form of merit
regulation similar to the Blue Sky laws in this country. Other
countries, such as the U.K., have a regulatory pattern based on dis-
closure similar to our federal securities laws.
Further, the identity of the regulatory authority differs
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from nation to nation. Few have an SEC-style national agency. In
Canada, for example, the primary responsibilities for regulating the
securities laws are left to political subdivisions such as provinces.
In other countries, such as Japan, the securities regulators do not
belong to an independent agency, but rather are part of the govern-
ment--such as the Ministry of Finance. In yet others, a stock ex-
change or the central bank serves as the primary regulator.
As a result of these regulatory disparities, a company may
be subject to inconsistent, duplicative, or even conflicting regu-
lations. Let us take, as an example, the problems facing a hypo-
thetical Canadian oil and gas company that is subject to both
Canadian and U.S. disclosure requirements. Canadian law requires
it to disclose probable reserves. But, SEC regulations prohibit
the disclosure of this same information. If the company is involved
in a proxy solicitation, therefore, it may need to prepare two sets
of proxy material: one disclosing probable reserves for Canadian
shareholders and another without such disclosure for U.S. share-
holders. Is the U.S. prohibition meaningful? Possibly not. Sophis-
ticated U.S. investors can easily obtain the information that is
disclosed in Canada, though less sophisticated investors may not.
B. Disclosure Standards
Indeed, the lack of uniformity in accounting principles,
auditing standards, and disclosure practices is usually the most
troublesome problem that foreign issuers must face in making a
registered offering in the U.S. Several such offerings have, in
fact, aborted due to the refusal or inability of foreign issuers to
comply with our disclosure standards--even as modified by the numer-
ous accommodations that the Commission has made to foreign regis-
trants. However, since the disclosure standards in the U.S. are
more vigorous than those of most other countries, U.S. companies
rarely seem to encounter similar difficulties when they offer their
securities abroad.
More subtle--but often equally burdensome--consequences occur
when different countries take only slightly different approaches to
the same disclosure concerns. Thus, as an illustration, many coun-
tries require inflation accounting and segment or line of business
disclosure. But, though the general thrust of the regulation is
the same, the details of satisfying those requirements vary. The
result is that a company may need to prepare slightly different
segment data or revise its inflation accounting to meet the require-
ments of a number of nations. In other terms, the company may be
required to incur the costs of disclosing substantially identical
information in differing formats.
C. Rights Offerings
Other issues raised by the internationalization of the securi-
ties marketplace go beyond problems raised by disparate disclosure
standards. For example, rights offerings to U.S. shareholders have
historically created special difficulties for foreign companies.
This is a major area of concern to many of these issuers; in some
countries, these offerings are the only method a company may use to
raise new equity capital.
Of course, since rights offerings permit shareholders to
purchase additional securities, they must be registered under the
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Securities Act of 1933 if made to U.S. shareholders. While such
registration is not required if the U.S. shareholders are prohibited
from exercising the rights and are permitted only to sell them a-
broad, some regulatory officials in these countries have objected
when companies with a large number of U.S. shareholders exclude
these shareholders from the offer. Although the Commission does
permit foreign companies that file annual reports on Form 20-F to
use Form S-16 to register the offering, this ameliorates rather than
solves the problem.
D. Acquisitions
Conflicts in the regulations of several countries are similar-
ly encountered in business combinations and acquisitions. For ex-
ample, an exchange offer between two foreign companies may be re-
quired to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 if the
company being acquired has U.S. shareholders. To avoid registration,
companies will often either exclude the U.S. shareholders from the
offer or limit their consideration to cash only, in lieu of securi-
ties. The problem is compounded if foreign regulations require that
the same offer be extended to all shareholders. And even more dif-
ficulties can be encountered if the exchange offer is hostile.
E. Equal Access
Another area of concern is whether securities professionals
of one nation, particularly brokers and dealers, will be granted
equal or direct access to the securities trading markets of other
nations. The so-called equal access problem has been addressed, but
only on an ad hoc, country-by-country basis. In 1975, for example,
the U.S. Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
provide that a broker-dealer, regardless of whether it is foreign
owned, may join U.S. stock exchanges so long as applicable qualifi-
cation standards are met. The Commission's broker-dealer registra-
tion requirements do not bar the registration of foreign-owned broker-
dealers, and U.S. regional stock exchanges and the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, Inc. have long admitted such firms to
membership. More recently, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has
begun to accept as members foreign-owned firms. Nevertheless, U.S.
broker-dealers too often are denied direct access to the markets of
other nations.
F. Supervision
An issue closely related to equal access involves surveillance
activities over multinational financial institutions. For example,
should the NYSE conduct inspections of the books and records of a
Swiss financial institution that owns an NYSE member? For many years,
the NYSE believed that it should conduct such inspections, or should
at least have the right to do so, in order to satisfy its own obli-
gations under the U.S. securities laws. However, in some cases the
secrecy laws of other nations simply do not permit the same kinds of
inspections that the NYSE might conduct of a U.S. corporation that
owned an NYSE member. If access barriers were to be lowered, some
compromise had to be reached.
Recently, the Commission approved an NYSE rule that appears
to be a sensible accommodation between, on the one hand, the need
for effective surveillance of parent companies of member firms and,
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on the other, a recognition that the laws and customs of some coun-
tries differ from those of the U.S. That compromise--which provides
for, among other things, limited, third party examinations of cer-
tain foreign based affiliates of NYSE members--was reached through
a process of negotiation between the NYSE and interested NYSE mem-
bers. But, as the Commission noted in its order approving the NYSE's
rule, "Ultimately, the best solution to the problems of surveillance
and enforcement that arise from the increasing international partici-
pation in securities markets, both here and abroad, may be an organ-
ized system of international cooperation and consultation among the
governments of the affected nations."
3. POTENTIAL REGULATORY RESPONSES
Unfortunately, there presently is little such systematic co-
ordination between the regulatory authorities of nations with free
market economies. And the contact that is made often arises in the
context of an ad hoc resolution to a particular regulatory concern.
This type of problem-solving may be expedient, but it is not neces-
sarily the most rational or optimal approach to the important and
ever-growing area of international finance.
A. Competition
A lack of better coordination among regulators can not only
unduly burden companies, but it can also undermine substantial in-
vestor protections. Regulatory disparities can allow, in effect,
regulatory forum shopping--and this, in turn, can initiate interna-
tional competition for the most lax regulation system.
One possible, but not preferable, regulatory response to this
situation would be an attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. Unfortunately, this is too often the path being taken. In a
sometimes misguided effort, regulators of particular nations may
seek to extend their regulatory provisions as far as possible--both
in the legal sense and the geographic sense. Generally, their
motive is to protect investors in their own country, but competitive
considerations may also apply. Domestic companies may complain of
unfair competition if foreign companies are given too many accommo-
dations or exceptions from the standards to which domestic companies
are held accountable.
Emphasizing extraterritorial jurisdiction is not the best
response to the challenges generated by a world marketplace. Along
with the obvious economic costs it may generate, inflexible applica-
tion of domestic regulation to foreign companies and undue asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction can lead to conflicts with
regulators from other countries. This, of course, can create un-
necessary and counterproductive confrontations between regulators.
Last year, for example, legislation was enacted in the United King-
dom in response to perceived efforts by U.S. regulatory officials
to expand their jurisdiction over British companies. The purpose
of this law is to provide British companies with protection from
certain requirements, prohibitions, and judgments imposed under
foreign laws. Although the British law responded primarily to the
U.S. antitrust laws and regulations, perceived threats from the
securities laws were also mentioned in the official release.
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B. Cooperation
Cooperation, rather than confrontation, among regulators must
be the rule. Cooperation increases mutual understanding of the goals
and methods of the various regulatory schemes. It permits a benefi-
cial exchange of ideas, information, and experiences. And, coopera-
tive regulators can present a united, powerful front against fraud
and can eliminate unnecessary regulatory differences and inconsis-
tencies and other obstacles to an efficient system of international
market finance.
Of course, cooperation has been long recognized as a desirable
goal, and many organizations are presently considering matters such
as harmonizing disclosure standards and developing international
accounting principles. Among these are the International Accounting
Standards Committee, the International Federation of Accounting, the
European Economic Community, the United Nations Commission on Trans-
national Corporations, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Yet other organizations are addressing issues re-
lating to securities trading, stock exchange listing and other prac-
tices, and enforcement liaison. This list is long; it includes the
Inter-American Conference of Securities Commissions and similar
agencies. Most of the organizations are productive and serve useful
purposes, and their work can be commended. In this vein, it should
be emphasized that the proposal about to be made is not a criticism
of these organizations--nor would its adoption make them redundant.
4. A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF SECURITIES REGULATORS
A. Organization
We recommend, first of all, the establishment of an Interna-
tional Committee of Securities Regulators. An informal Committee,
in our opinion, could be established very expeditiously. After all,
regulators from different countries have set up effective liaisons
and committees in the past to produce cooperative enforcement ef-
forts, such as in the 10S fraud. This Committee would serve as a
clearing-house of information, promote the harmonization of the
various national markets, encourage the interchange of ideas and
experiences, and assist in the harmonization of diverse accounting
and disclosure practices. Even these relatively limited steps could
increase the regulators' mutual understanding and cooperation.
Eventually, and as a long-term goal, a multilateral treaty
should be negotiated to establish the Committee formally. It could
be expected that the treaty would require each signatory nation to
designate a particular institution or agency as its securities
regulator. The Committee, in turn, would be empowered to promulgate
certain decisions that would be binding on the signatories with
regard to the results to be achieved--although not as to the method
of implementing them. In other words, the designated regulators
would be bound to implement the Committee decisions by making them
part of domestic law or regulations, but the regulator could select
the method of implementation that best suits its national system of
regulation and its own customs. In essence, the Committee's deci-
sions would be similar in their effect to directives now issued by
the European Economic Community. The decisions of necessity would
be limited to areas where difference of national custom and philoso-
phy would permit a consensus.
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B. Advantages
This approach is preferable to the alternative of creating a
supranational securities agency. First, enforcement would be more
practical if sanctions exist under domestic law as well as interna-
tional law. Under this proposal, Committee decisions would have the
effect of local law and could be enforced by any regulatory authority.
Further, the creation of a cooperative international committee for
securities matters would not necessitate a large bureaucracy in
addition to the staffs of the domestic regulators. Indeed, the Com-
mittee could be staffed adequately by the domestic regulators. Fi-
nally, as a practical matter, nations would be more likely to accede
to the treaty if their own regulators can participate directly in
the decisionmaking--the treaty would not require the surrender of
their regulatory control to a supranational organization.
It is not contemplated that such a committee would involve
itself with companies that do not participate voluntarily in world
securities markets. Regulation of these companies would, and should,
be left to domestic regulators. At the other end of the spectrum,
however, for companies that truly are regular participants in the
world securities markets, the Committee could establish procedures
whereby these "world class companies" could list on any exchange or
make an offering in any country provided they made certain agreed
disclosures.
C. Potential Problems
Nonetheless, the problems of developing such a Committee
should not be understated. Few nations have a single regulatory
body. Instead many have several organizations or regulate at the
state or federal level. Further, some nations do not have an estab-
lished accounting profession or established accounting principles
or auditing standards. And, of course, regulatory philosophies,
principles of corporate structure, business customs, and legal sys-
tems often vary greatly from nation to nation.
Yet, while these differences create difficult problems, they
are not insurmountable. In fact, the internationalization of the
capital markets is, in itself, forcing ad hoc responses to many of
the concerns raised today. The point is, however, that the expedient
solution or the temporary amelioration may not always be the most
rational or optimal solution over time.
To suggest that a cooperative framework can be quickly achiev-
ed would be unrealistic. Yet, one way or the other, events march on.
One way or the other, markets will develop. And in consequence, one
way or the other, regulators will respond. To act without coordina-
tion risks the creation of rigid regulatory constructs, which would
stand as opposing fortresses rather than cooperative camps. It is
far better to establish, now, the beginnings of a framework that can
start to help direct the stream of regulation, if not commerce, into
the greatest harmony practically achievable.
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, an international securities market is rapidly
becoming more and more of a reality--and a necessity. Indeed, in
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view of the ever-diminishing resources of the world, it is essential
that those resources be allocated in the most efficient manner. A
properly functioning worldwide market system is a vital element in
achieving that result.
The development of such a system is too important to every-
one's welfare to be left to chance. Random, ad hoc regulation can
have dysfunctional consequences. It can thwart potentially useful
developments, create artificial impediments, and possibly prevent
the development of an efficient market system. It is, as a con-
sequence, imperative that serious thought and study be devoted to
this topic immediately and that constructive efforts to encourage
the cooperation of regulators be instituted. Implementing a world
securities market system that meets the needs of the contemporary
international economy will be one of the important requirements--
and a crucial challenge--of this decade.
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